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 
Abstract— Tor is free software that enables anonymous 
communication. It defends users against traffic analysis and 
network surveillance. It is also useful for confidential business 
activities and state security. At the same time, anonymized 
protocols have been used to access criminal websites such as those 
dealing with illegal drugs. This paper proposes a new method for 
launching a fingerprinting attack to analyze Tor traffic in order 
to detect users who access illegal websites. Our new method is 
based on Stacked Denoising Autoencoder, a deep-learning 
technology. Our evaluation results show 0.88 accuracy in a 
closed-world test. In an open-world test, the true positive rate is 
0.86 and the false positive rate is 0.02. 
 
Index Terms— Network Security, Tor, Fingerprinting Attack, 
Deep Learning, Autoencoder 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Onion Router (Tor) is free software that enables 
anonymous communication. [1, 2]. It defends users against 
traffic analysis and network surveillance. It is also useful for 
confidential business activities and state security. At the same 
time, anonymized protocols have been used to access criminal 
websites such as those dealing with illegal drugs. There is a 
need to develop a method that can identify websites when 
anonymized protocols are used. 
This paper proposes a new method for launching a 
fingerprinting attack to analyze Tor traffic in order to detect 
users who access illegal websites. Using a fingerprinting 
attack, we can identify a website that a user accesses on the 
basis of traffic features such as packet length, number of 
packets, and time. We can analyze this information from 
captured packets regardless of encryption. Our new method for 
fingerprinting attacks is based on Stacked Denoising 
Autoencoder (SDAE), a deep-learning technology. Our 
evaluation results show 0.88 accuracy is in a closed-world test. 
In an open world test, the true positive rate (TPR) and false 
positive rate (FPR) are 0.86 and 0.02, respectively. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
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II explains the technical background. Section III describes 
related work. Our new method is proposed in Section IV. 
Section V shows the evaluation results. Section VI concludes 
the paper. 
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Tor Anonymity 
Tor [1, 2] is a popular anonymized protocol. Figure 1 shows 
an example of a Tor configuration. At the initial setting, there 
are three nodes between a user and a web server, as shown in 
Figure 1. Tor traffic data is encrypted using Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) between a user and each Tor node. Thus, Tor 
nodes do not know the original plain data, with one exception. 
The closest node to the web server can read the original data 
without encryption. In a Tor configuration, each node knows 
only the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of adjacent nodes that 
are directly connected to the node. 
In the Tor protocol, content data is encapsulated into a series 
of cells, each with a fixed length of 512 bytes. It is difficult to 
estimate the original content only from the packet length. 
 
User
(victim of 
fingerprinting attack)
Tor Server 1
Tor Server 3
Tor Server 2 Web Server
 
Fig. 1. Configuration of Tor 
 
B. Fingerprinting Attacks on a Website 
1) Fingerprinting 
A website fingerprinting attack aims to detect a website 
even if the traffic is encrypted using Tor or a virtual private 
network (VPN). We cannot specify the website by inspecting 
the encrypted payload. However, we can utilize the packet 
information, such as packet length, number of packets, and 
time. In a fingerprinting attack, we can specify a website by 
providing the packet information. 
There are two methods for capturing traffic data in Tor. In 
the first method, an attacker (analyzer) prepares an entry node 
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 of Tor and captures the traffic through this node. However, the 
Tor protocol selects nodes at random. It is unlikely that a 
specific victim connects to the attacker's node. In the second 
method, an attacker (analyzer) is a network operator, such as 
an Internet service provider (ISP). He or she can capture traffic 
packets between a victim and the entry node of Tor. This is a 
realistic scenario. This paper proposes a new approach using 
the second method. 
2) Closed- and Open-World Tests 
There are two evaluation schemes for fingerprinting attacks. 
The first scheme is a closed-world test. It conducts a test in 
which a victim can access only a limited number of websites, 
which the attacker attempts to detect. For example, an attacker 
might prepare 100 monitored sites and investigate the features 
of these 100 websites. The victim can access only these 100 
websites. 
The second scheme is an open-world test. In such a test, a 
victim can freely access any websites on the Internet. The 
attacker must be able to determine whether a website is 
monitored or non-monitored. If it is a monitored website, the 
attacker must be able to determine which website among the 
100 monitored sites it is. This paper uses two evaluation 
schemes, closed and open. 
C. SDAE 
   Deep learning is an attractive method in machine learning. It 
is called deep because it utilizes a multiple-layered neural 
network. An autoencoder is a deep-learning technique. This 
paper uses SDAE. 
An autoencoder is a neural network that consists of input, 
hidden, and output layers. Figure 2 shows an example of an 
autoencoder. It calculates weights on directed edges in Figure 
2 by learning from input data. One specific autoencoder 
feature is that the input data (vector) and the output data 
(vector) must be equal. 
 
Input Hidden Output
x yh
W W 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of an Autoencoder 
 
An autoencoder is represented by a mathematical formula. 
In formula (1), the input layer is represented as a vector 𝒙, the 
output of the hidden layer as a vector 𝒉, and weights from the 
input layer to the hidden layer as a matrix 𝑾 and vector 𝒃. The 
vector 𝒃 represents bias terms. We also define an activation 
function 𝑓. Data propagation from the input layer to the hidden 
layer is calculated using formula (1). 
 𝒉 = 𝑓(𝑾𝒙 + 𝒃) (1) 
Similarly, we define the output from the output layer as a 
vector 𝒚, and the weights from the hidden layer to the output 
layer are represented as a matrix 𝑾′ and vector 𝒃′. The vector 
𝒃′ consists of bias terms. We also define an activation function 
𝑓′. Data propagation from the hidden layer to the output layer 
is calculated using formula (2). 
 𝒚 = 𝑓′(𝑾′𝒉 + 𝒃′) (2) 
The autoencoder determines the weights 𝑾  and 𝑾′  that 
equalize the input 𝒙 and output 𝒚. The weights are calculated 
using formula (3), which minimizes the difference between the 
input data {𝒙𝒊, … } and output 𝒚. 
 min
𝑾,𝒃,𝑾′,𝒃′
∑‖𝒙𝒊 − 𝑓′(𝑾
′𝑓(𝑾𝒙𝒊 + 𝒃) + 𝒃′)‖2
2
𝑖
 (3) 
Using an autoencoder, we can decrease the dimensions of 
data vectors. The dimension of 𝒉 is less than that of 𝒙 or 𝒚. 
The output vector 𝒉 of the hidden layer is used as a feature 
vector in machine learning.  
We can combine multiple autoencoders by overlapping a 
hidden layer as an input of the second autoencoder. This type 
of autoencoder is called Stacked Autoencoder (SAE). Figure 3 
shows an example. 
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Input Hidden
Input Hidden
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Autoencoder 2
 
Fig. 3. Structure of a Stacked Autoencoder 
 
It can be meaningful to add noise to an input vector. This 
type of autoencoder is called a denoising autoencoder (DAE). 
By adding noise data, an autoencoder can avoid overlearning 
or overfitting, with the result that formula (3) is satisfied only 
for the training data. Noise is sometimes useful to generalize 
the training data. A DAE can attain higher accuracy. 
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 We can further combine multiple DAEs similarly to SAEs, 
This type of autoencoder is called SDAE. This paper uses 
SDAEs. We use Pylearn2 software [3] as a deep-learning tool. 
III. RELATED WORK 
A. Optimal String Alignment Distance (OSAD) 
In 2013, Wang and Goldberg [4] conducted a fingerprinting 
attack using OSAD. In their method, a sequence of Tor cells is 
treated as a string. If two instances of a cell string are captured 
for the same site, the distance between the two instances is 
small. If they are captured for two different sites, the distance 
of the two instances is large. Wang and Goldberg used OSAD 
in an algorithm to calculate the distance.  
Wang and Goldberg used this distance as the kernel matrix 
in a support vector machine (SVM). They defined the distance 
and the kernel by formulas (4) and (5), respectively. s1 and s2 
are two strings, and the distance between s1  and s2  is 
D(s1, s2).  
 
D′(s1, s2) =
D(s1, s2)
𝑚𝑖𝑛(|𝑠1|, |𝑠2|)
 (4) 
 
 K(s1, s2) = 𝑒
−D′(s1,s2)
2
 (5) 
 
When D′ = 0, two strings are equal, and K becomes one. 
When the distance between two strings is large, K becomes 
small. When D → ∞, the limit of K becomes zero. Therefore, 
we can use K as the kernel matrix of an SVM. Wang and 
Goldberg used the one-against-one method in their SVM. This 
method is used for multi-class classification by repeating 
two-class classifications and by performing majority voting. 
B. k-Nearest Neighbor Algorithm (k-NN) 
In 2014, Wang et al. [5] proposed another fingerprinting 
attack using the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) algorithm. In their 
new method, they extract features from captured packets. 
 General features (total transmission size, total 
transmission time, and numbers of incoming and 
outgoing packets) 
 Packet ordering 
 Concentration of outgoing packets 
 Bursts 
Some features are more meaningful than others. Then, they 
determine the weights of features. Finally, they classify test 
data using the k-NN method with features and weights. 
IV. NEW METHOD 
A. Dataset for Learning and Evaluation 
This paper uses the same dataset as that of Wang [6] in our 
evaluation experiment. This dataset contains 100 sites as 
monitored web sites and 9,000 sites as non-monitored sites. 
Monitored sites are used in the closed-world test. 
Non-monitored sites are used in the open-world test. Each 
monitored site has 90 instances (cells), and each 
non-monitored site has one instance. Monitored sites consist of 
porn sites, Bit Torrent trackers’ sites, and sites that have 
religious or political contents. Access to these sites is blocked 
in China, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia. Non-monitored 
sites consist of Alexa’s list [7], which covers ordinary popular 
web pages. In Figure 4, the first column records when a cell is 
captured. The timestamp unit is seconds. The time at which the 
first cell is sent is 0.0. The second column indicates the 
direction of a cell. When a cell is sent from a victim (target) to 
a Tor node, it is represented as 1. When a cell is sent from a Tor 
node to a victim, it is represented as −1. This time sequence 
starts when the web page begins loading and ends when the 
last cell is sent. 
 
0.0                     1
0.0                     1
0.116133928299    1
0.499715805054         -1
0.499715805054   -1
0.782404899597   -1
0.969846963882   -1
0.969846963882   -1
0.969846963882   -1
0.969846963882   -1
 
Fig. 4. Example of dataset. 
 
We count the number of cells in a packet. Since the size of a 
cell is fixed at 512 bytes, the number of cells is counted by 
dividing the packet length by 600. We use not 512 but 600 
because we consider inter-cell headers and the overhead 
[10] .Tor sends cells for flow control at regular intervals. Such 
a control cell is called a SENDME cell. SENDME cells are not 
useful in fingerprinting attacks. We exclude SENDME cells 
from the dataset. 
B. Proposed Method 
First, an attacker (analyzer) collects training data for 
machine learning. The attacker accesses websites he or she 
wants to monitor through Tor fingerprinting and then captures 
the traffic data repeatedly, e.g.,., 100 times. The attacker also 
collects traffic data from a large number of other websites. The 
data is used for the open-world test. Since this paper uses 
Wang’s dataset, we can omit the data collection phase. 
Next, the attacker extracts Tor cells from the captured data. 
These are used as input to the autoencoder. Again, we can omit 
this phase, because we use the same dataset as that in Wang’s 
method. Tor cells are already extracted. Then, we sort out data 
to create an input vector to the autoencoder. This paper uses 
the direction of a cell as an element of an input vector. It is a 
simple method. We do not use other features. It should be 
noted here that input vectors have a fixed length (dimension). 
The original traffic data have a variety of lengths (dimensions) 
according to the traffic pattern. We truncate a sequence of cells 
if the length is greater than 5,000. If the number of cells is less 
than 5,000, we put 0 as dummy padding to create a vector of 
size 5,000. Figure 5 shows an example of input data 
corresponding to Figure 4. 
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 1, 1, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
 -1, -1, 1, -1, 1, 1,  ... , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0  
Fig. 5. Example of input data 
 
After preparing the data, the attacker conducts training using 
the SDAE. In our experiment, we specifically use a multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) that has two layers of SDAEs and an output 
layer realized by a softmax function. The parameters of the 
SDAE and MLP will be shown in the next section (V). Before 
inputting the training data, we randomize the order of the 
training vectors in the data set. If a batch has many similar 
vectors, the efficiency of learning might be decreased.  
The test data for evaluation is prepared similarly to the 
training data. 
V. EVALUATION 
A. Environment 
Table 1 shows the experimental environment. We use 
Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) [8] to 
accelerate the training using a graphical processing unit (GPU). 
Table 1 shows the machine specification, which includes a 
GeForce GTX 750 Ti graphics card by NVIDIA. 
 
TABLE 1 
ENVIRONMENT OF EXPERIMENT 
OS Ubuntu 14.04.03 LTS 
CPU Intel Core i7-4790 
RAM 32 GB 
GPU NVIDIA GeForce GTX 750 Ti 
 
B. Closed-World Test 
1) Overview 
In the closed-world test, the dataset contains 100 monitored 
sites, with each site containing 90 cell instances. Seventy-two 
instances are used for training data, and 18 instances for test 
data. This closed-world test is a multi-class classification. We 
labeled monitored websites as class 0 to class 99. 
2) Layer 
We used an MLP with two layers of SDAEs and with the 
output layer realized by a softmax function. Parameters of 
Pylearn2 are shows in Tables 2 and 3. 
Nvis and nhid are the dimensions of the input and hidden 
layers of the Autoencoder, respectively. Learning rate is a 
coefficient during the weight-training phase. 
 
TABLE 2 
PARAMETERS OF SDAE (CLOSED-WORLD TEST) 
Parameter First Layer Second Layer 
nvis 5000 500 
nhid 500 125 
learning_rate 0.001 0.001 
batch_size 50 50 
 
TABLE 3 
PARAMETERS OF MLP (CLOSED-WORLD TEST) 
Parameter MLP 
Nvis 5000 
n_classes 100 
learning_rate 0.005 
batch_size 200 
 
3) Results 
We conducted a series of closed-world tests while changing 
the number of learning sessions (max_epoch) every five times. 
Values of max_epoch in each DAE and the output layer are the 
same. Figure 6 shows the accuracy of the closed-world tests. 
The highest accuracy of 0.88 is attained when the number of 
learning sessions is 50. 
 
Fig. 6. Relation between max_epoch and accuracy in closed world test. 
 
We also conduct a series of closed-world tests by changing 
the dimensions, nvis and nhid. We fix the max_epoch value as 
50. The results are shown in Table 4. There is no major change 
in the accuracy by the dimension parameters of the hidden 
layer of the SDAE. The maximum accuracy is attained when 
the nhid values of the first and second layers are 1,000 and 500, 
respectively. When the nhid values are 500 for the first layer 
and 125 for the second, the results are similar. 
 
TABLE 4 
RESULTS WHEN CHANGING NVIS AND NHID 
(CLOSED-WORLD TEST) 
Accuracy 1st layer 
250 500 750 1000 
2nd 
layer 
125 86.4 88.1 86.9 86.9 
250 87.1 87.2 87.6 87.6 
500 - 87.3 87.2 88.2 
750 - - 87.9 87.3 
1000 - - - 87.6 
 
4) Execution time 
Table 5 shows the execution time when max_epoch is set as 
50. In this experiment, the autoencoder can use the weight that 
is already learned. Then, the test time is very short. The 
training time is also short, because the autoencoder does not 
need to perform multiple layers of backpropagation. 
 
TABLE 5 
EXECUTION TIME (CLOSED-WORLD TEST) 
Process Description Time [s] 
Data 
Transmission 
Time to convert train data and test data to 
Pylearn2 format. 
124.4 
Learning Time Time to train using 7200 train data. 163.0 
Test Time Time to test 1800 Test data 3.0 
 
5) Three-layer SDAE 
The above results are obtained for the closed-world test by 
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 the two-layer SDAE. It is worthwhile investigating the 
performance of the three-layer SDAE. 
We conduct another closed-world test using a three-layer 
SDAE. Table 6 shows the parameters of the new SDAE. The 
parameters of the MLP are the same as those in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 6 
PARAMETERS OF THREE-LAYER SDAE (CLOSED-WORLD TEST) 
Parameter 1st Layer 2nd Layer 3rd Layer 
nvis 5000 750 500 
nhid 750 500 250 
learning_rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 
batch_size 50 50 50 
 
Figure 7 shows the results while changing the learning 
intervals (max_epochs) every ten times. The maximum 
accuracy is 0.88, the same accuracy achieved by the two-layer 
SDAE. However, when three layers are used, the convergence 
of learning becomes slow compared with the two-layer SDAE. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Relation between max_epoch and accuracy in closed-world test. 
 
The learning and test times also become slow. For the 
three-layer SDAE, when max_epoch is 50, the learning time 
becomes 241.9 s and the testing time becomes 3.6 s. 
C. Open-World Test 
1) Overview 
In the open-world test, we use the data not only of 100 
monitored sites, but also those of 9,000 non-monitored sites. 
The data of the monitored sites is divided into 72 instances for 
training data and 18 instances for testing data. We use 1,800 
instances of non-monitored sites as the testing data. 
A non-monitored website never appears in the training data. 
The victim can access a new website that the attacker does not 
expect. We label monitored websites as classes 0 to 99 and all 
the non-monitored websites as a single class 100. 
2) Layer 
In the open-world test, we use an MLP that has an input 
layer with a dimension of 5,000 and a two-layer DAE. The 
output layer is realized by a softmax function. The parameters 
of Pylearn2 are showed in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
TABLE 7 
PARAMETERS OF SDAE (OPEN-WORLD TEST) 
Parameter First Layer Second Layer 
Nvis 5000 500 
Nhid 500 125 
learrning_rate 0.001 0.001 
batch_size 50 50 
max_epoch 30 30 
 
TABLE 8 
PARAMETERS OF MLP (OPEN-WORLD TEST) 
Parameter MLP 
Nvis 5000 
n_classes 101 
learning_rate 0.005 
batch_size 200 
max_epoch 50 
 
3) Results 
We investigate the TPR, i.e., the rate at which monitored 
websites are classified correctly, and the FPR, i.e.,., the rate at 
which a non-monitored website is classified as a monitored 
site. The TPR is shown in Figure 8, and the FPR is shown in 
Figure 9. 
In Figure 8, when the number of training data instances of 
non-monitored sites is larger, the TPR is lower. The maximum 
TPR is 0.87, when the number of the training data of 
non-monitored sites is 1,000, and the minimum TPR is 0.86, 
when the number is 7,000. In Figure 9, in addition to the TPR, 
when the number of training data instances of non-monitored 
sites is larger, the FPR is lower. The minimum FPR is 0.02, 
when the number of training data of non-monitored sites is 
7,000. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Relation between number of training data of non-monitored sites and 
TPR in the open-world test. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Relation between number of training data of non-monitored sites and 
FPR in open-world test. 
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There is a trade-off between TPR and FPR. It is better to have a 
high value of TPR, while keeping the FPR value low. 
Comparison with Related Work 
Wang et al. showed the results of the OSAD [4] and k-NN 
methods [5] using the same dataset. Table 9 shows the 
comparison with previously known methods and our method. 
In our proposed method, the accuracy in the closed-world 
test is 0.88, slightly lower than those of OSAD and k-NN. In 
the open-world test, our TPR (0.86) is higher than that of 
OSAD, and our FPR (0.02) is lower than that of OSAD. 
However, our FPR is higher than that of the k-NN method. 
 
TABLE 9 
COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS 
Method Accuracy in Closed 
World Test 
TPR in Open 
World Test 
FPR in Open 
World Test 
Our Method 0.88 0.86 0.02 
OSAD Method 0.90 0.83 0.06 
k-NN Method 0.91 0.85 0.006 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. Summary 
Here we propose a new method for fingerprinting attacks on 
Tor anonymity using SDAE. The input vector takes a very 
simple form, with elements 1, −1, or 0. The evaluation results 
show an accuracy of 0.88 in the closed-world test and TPR and 
FPR values of 0.86 and 0.02, respectively, in the open-world 
test. It is the advantage of our method that we can realize a high 
accuracy without selecting the features manually.  Out method 
is based on mechanical  Deep Learning. 
This paper shows that deep-learning technology can be 
applied to fingerprinting attacks on Tor communications to 
have results comparable to those of existing technologies. 
B. Future Research 
It may be meaningful to combine our method with other 
methods proposed in related work. For example, the output of 
SDAE can be used as features in Wang’s method and used for 
training by k-NN.  
There are convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and 
recurrent neural networks (RNNs) in deep learning. CNN has 
been used in pattern recognition. RNN can handle time-series 
data. It may be possible to improve the accuracy of our method 
by applying other neural network technologies as well. 
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